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It is a generally accepted proposition that the duty of the directors of a company 
is to run the business of the company in the best interests of the company. 
Some, who are perhaps less pedantic about the separation in legal terms of the 
company from its shareholders, would extend the beneficiary of these duties to 
include the shareholders. Nevertheless, this separation is of crucial importance, 
in particular in shifting the primary liability for the debts incurred in running the 
business, from the individual entrepreneur, to the company which, in law, owns 
and carries on the business. The company is the primary debtor and the legal 
status of the entrepreneur is that of being a director of, and a shareholder with 
limited liability in, the company. Thus, in principle, the company, alone, is 
responsible for the debts incurred in the running of the company and the 
creditors are, in principle, precluded from looking to the entrepreneur for 
payment of any shortfall arising as a result of the company's insolvency.  
 
It is also the case that in a number of jurisdictions statutory changes have 
sought, in certain circumstances, to render the directors and others who were 
concerned with the management of the company prior to the insolvent 
liquidation, liable to contribute to the assets of the company so as to assist the 
insolvent estate in meeting the company's debts to its creditors. This paper 
aims to explore this statutory jurisdiction. Before this, however, it will seek to 
describe briefly the process by which the shift from unlimited to limited liability 
trading was achieved. Thereafter, it will look at the common law response to 
this changed dispensation. It will end by examining briefly a comparatively new 
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phenomenon, namely that of a shift in the focus of the directors' duties from 
company and shareholders to creditors as the company becomes insolvent and 
nears the stage of a formal declaration of its insolvent status. As we will 
discover, this new phenomenon seems to have struck a chord in many different 
jurisdictions, but is, on the other hand elusive and not without controversy. If, as 
this principle would have it, the focus of the duty of director and officers shifts to 
creditors when the company enters the zone of insolvency, the creditors should 
be able to enforce that duty before the formal declaration of insolvency. 
Arguably, they should also be entitled to seek information about the proposed 
actions of the company and they should be able to apply to court to prohibit any 
action which they perceive to be against their interests. 
 
The notion of the 'zone of insolvency' may have a distinctly modern ring about 
it, but I hope to show that it has a long pedigree. I hope also to illustrate that it 
encompasses a clash between two fundamental principles in the conception 
and operation of limited liability companies, namely the protection of the 
company's creditors and the right and the duty of the directors and officers of 
the company to run the business of the company in the best interests of the 
shareholders.  
 
Thus the first part of this paper looks forward to formal insolvency, the second 
looks back from formal insolvency to the actions of the directors as the 
company approaches its downfall. Each part is distinctive. Yet, there is an 
obvious link between these two parts. If the legal system does provide for the 
personal liability of the directors and officers who led the company into formal 
insolvency, this is likely to influence the conduct of those directors and officers 
when they perceive this to be the likely fate of the company. The threat of such 
personal liability may encourage decisions and conduct which further the 
creditors' interests and thus, informally, bring about this shift in the focus of the 
duty of directors and officers. 
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I take the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd1
2 The period leading up to Salomon 
 as the starting point for the 
exploration of these ideas. In its result, this decision greatly strengthened the 
position of directors and shareholders (whom I will sometimes refer to, 
collectively, as the entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial interest) at the expense 
of the creditors. Much of the post-Salomon history has been the digesting of the 
dispensation which was created by the decision, and the seeking to restore, or 
at least maintain, the balance between these competing interests.  
 
Salomon's case was one of the great exports of the British Empire and 
justifiably can claim the title of father or grandfather, or maybe Godfather, of 
company law for colonials and colonists alike. In South Africa, where I first 
studied company law under the great Professor HR ('Bobby') Hahlo – later the 
Director of the Institute of Comparative Law at McGill University, Montreal – 
Salomon's case had pride of place at the start of the course and was on the 
first substantive page of Hahlo's "Company Law Through the Cases", the first 
company law casebook of the English-inspired common law world.  
 
To law students, Salomon's case meant the authority for the proposition that 
the company was a separate legal entity from that of the people who 
constituted the company, as well as the beginning of the process of wrestling 
with the veil of incorporation and its piercing or – in more genteel discussions – 
its lifting. The first of these propositions is at the root of the shift in the balance 
of power from creditor to entrepreneur, the second is our continuing attempt to 
ensure that we have achieved the right balance between these two opposing 
commercial forces.  
 
 
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the overwhelming mass of 
commercial trading in Great Britain was undertaken by single traders or by 
                                            
1  Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22, upholding an appeal from the court of first instance and 
the Court of Appeal, sub. nom. Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 323.  
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partnerships of traders, without any limit of personal liability.2 Occasional 
attempts to provide for limited liability by contract were either too cumbersome 
or were rejected by the courts.3 This was changed, or rather the process of 
change from unlimited to limited liability trading was started, with the passage 
of the Limited Liability Act in 1855. The latter act was only achieved after a 
spirited public debate,4 and was grafted on to the Joint Stock Companies Act of 
1844,5
When the comparison was drawn between, on the one hand, a registered 
company which offered limited liability to its investors and directors, and, on the 
other, the partners of a partnership, it is hardly surprising that there were 
misgivings in this new dispensation. While there could be no rational objection 
to seeking an escape from the labyrinthine problems which arose from the 
unincorporated status of the partnership compounded as they were by the 
much criticised procedures of the Courts of Equity,
 and together these and other acts were consolidated in 1862 as Britain's 
first Companies Act.  
 
6
There was a heady mix of emotions and position in this debate. High Tories 
were opposed to limited liability and subscribed to the view expressed in the 
famous decision of Waugh v Carver
 permitting small time 
entrepreneurial activity without personal liability was something else. 
 
7
                                            
2  Large infrastructural projects like the building of the railways, roads and canals and the 
development of the gas and electricity industries were undertaken by corporations 
specially created by Act of Parliament; the expense and cumbersome nature of petitioning 
parliament for the passage of an appropriate act was well beyond the ordinary every day 
merchant.  
3  See eg Re Sea Fire and Life Assurance Company (Greenwood's case) (1854) 3 De GM & 
G 459, 43 ER 180; Hallett v Dowdall (1852) 21 LJ QB 98. 
4  The best short account of this campaign is in ch 3 of Davies and Gower Gower's 
Principles, but only up to and including the 6th edition (1997). Space constraints forced the 
exclusion of the content of these chapters from the 7th (2003) edition, see Davies and 
Gower Principles of Modern Company Law, to the regret of the current editor – see vi. 
5  The first registered companies act in Great Britain, passed at a time when Gladstone was 
the President of the Board of Trade – the responsible Ministry. 
6  See Formoy Historical Foundations of Company Law 32-36; of the many fictional 
accounts, it is doubtful whether anything can outdo the first page of Charles Dickens's 
Bleak House. 
7  Waugh v Carver (1793) 126 ER 525, 2 Hy Bl 235. 
 that "he who feels the benefit should also 
feel the burden", itself a restatement of Chief Justice Grey's dictum some 18 
years earlier "that every man who has the share of the profits of a trade, ought 
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to bear his share of the loss".8 Support for limited liability, on the other hand, 
came from the radical Whigs (the predecessors of today's UK Liberals) and the 
utilitarian economists such as Jeremy Bentham9
Unless we deal with each other upon some presumption of 
confidence … the disruption of human society must necessarily 
follow. Fraud and wickedness are not to be presumed in 
individuals.
 and John Stuart Mill. Human 
nature and religion were also pressed in aid by the respective protagonists. 
Robert Lowe, the vice-president of the Board of Trade, who is considered 
largely responsible for the pioneering Limited Liability Act of 1855, denounced 
the evangelical fervour of his opponents. 
 
10
This evangelical opposition came from men like John Ramsay McCulloch, a 
prolific Scottish journalist, who was editor of both The Scotsman and the 
 
 
Edinburgh Review, an ardent disciple of classical Ricardo economics and a 
lecturer on political economy at University College London in the early 1830s. 
There was no separation of human nature and economics for McCulloch. 
 
In the scheme laid down by Providence for the government of the 
world, there is no shifting or narrowing of responsibilities, every man 
being personally answerable to the utmost extent for all his actions. 
But the advocates of limited liability proclaim in their superior wisdom 
that the scheme of Providence may be advantageously modified, 
and that debts and contracts may be contracted which the debtors 
though they have the means, shall not be bound to discharge.11
                                            
8  Grace v Smith (1775) 96 ER 587, 588; 2 Wm Bl 997. 
9  "Were it lawful for everyone to engage in commercial undertakings for a limited amount, 
how many facilities would be afforded to men of genius! All classes of society would 
furnish assistance to inventive industry" Bentham Manual of Political Economy.  
10  Lowe in the British House of Commons, 1 February 1856. 
11  McCulloch Considerations on Partnership with Limited Liability 10-11. 
  
 
One of McCullough's best known pupils was Lord Overstone, a top flight 
political economist of the day who described the Limited Liability Act as a fraud 
on creditors, a harbinger of –  
 
reckless speculation. … A great disease … was likely to settle upon 
this country - the indiscriminate desire for limited liability. 
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Parliament had to act, in his view, to stem the rising tide of over-trading and 
speculation by making –  
 
the laws of bankruptcy more stringent, and the responsibility of all 
traders more severe.12
Yet, despite its obvious appeal, limited liability was slow in actually coming. For 
one reason or another, the established pattern of high par value shares 




a sum which represented the sanguine expectations of a fond owner 
rather than anything that can be called a businesslike or reasonable 
estimate of value.
 and there was also a strong body of opinion 
which held that the protection of limited liability was intended only for investors 
in large enterprises and was not for single traders or small partnerships. This 
controversy was settled by Salomon's case. Salomon had registered a 
company (A Salomon and Co Ltd), of which he was the overwhelming 
shareholder and managing director. Thereafter he had sold the business he ran 
as an individual trader, to that company for –  
 
14
The liquidator's claim succeeded in the court of first instance and this decision 
was upheld by the Court of Appeal, but a unanimous House of Lords 
overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal. The express legal basis for the 
decisions of the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal was that the 
company was merely Salomon's agent or trustee and that Salomon as the 
principal or the beneficiary, was liable for the acts and debts of his agent or 
trustee. Lord Justice Lindley – one of the greatest of all company law judges in 
  
 
Within eighteen months, the business failed and the company went into 
insolvent liquidation. The liquidator claimed that Salomon was obliged to 
indemnify all the creditors of the company. 
 
                                            
12  British House of Lords debates, 22 May 1855. 
13  It is not uncommon to find share par values at £100 or higher during the last half of the 
nineteenth century. 
14  Lord Macnaghten, Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC at 49. 
HH RAJAK  PER/PELJ  2008(11)1 
/211 37 
England – sat in the Court of Appeal and in his judgment summarised the 
liquidator's case in the following terms:15
There can be no doubt that in this case an attempt has been made 
to use the machinery of the Companies Act, for a purpose for which 
it was never intended. The legislature contemplated the 
encouragement of trade by enabling a comparatively small number 
of persons- namely not less than seven
 
 
The appeal raises a question of very great importance, not only to 
the persons immediately affected by the decision, but also to a large 
number of persons who form what are called 'one-man companies.' 
Such companies were unheard of until a comparatively recent 





Another of the judges in the Court of Appeal was less measured in his 
language:
 - to carry on business with 
a limited joint stock or capital, and without the risk of liability beyond 
the loss of such joint stock or capital. But the legislature never 
contemplated an extension of limited liability to sole traders or to a 
fewer number than seven. ... Although in the present case, there 
were, and are, seven members, yet it was manifest that six of them 
are members simply in order to enable the seventh himself to carry 
on business with limited liability. 
 
... The company in this case has been regarded by [the judge in the 
court below] as the agent of Aron Salomon. I should rather liken the 
company to a trustee for him - a trustee improperly brought into 
existence by him to enable him to do what the statute prohibits. 
 
17
But legalise this 'scandal', the House of Lords did. In effect, the basis for the 
various concurring speeches in the House of Lords was that Salomon had done 
no more and no less than was required of him to create a limited liability 
 
 
It would be lamentable if a scheme like this could not be defeated. If 
we were to permit it to succeed we would be authorizing a 
perversion of the Joint Stock Companies Act. We should be giving 
vitality to that which is a myth and a fiction. ... To legalize such a 
transaction would be a scandal. 
 
                                            
15  Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch at 336, 337, 338. 
16  As it happened, Salomon's wife and five children made up the then minimum of 7 for a 
registered company.  
17  Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch at 340-341. 
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company. The rest followed. With the company created, a separate legal 
person came into existence and conducted its own business, entered into its 
own contracts (including a contract to purchase the business from Salomon) 
and there was nothing in the statute to suggest that this was wrongful. Lord 
Herschell, expressed this view in the following terms:18
This was a most significant moment in the history of British corporate and 
commercial law and it shaped much that was to come, in particular that the 
financial burden of corporate failure would be thrown on to the creditors. 
Investors and more importantly directors, executives and management would 
be relieved of the threat of losing their own wealth as a consequence of 
business failure. The decision of the House of Lords - sanctioned as it must be 
taken to have been by the legislature in not altering the Companies Act in the 
wake of this decision – could be seen as an open invitation to the entrepreneur, 
small, as well as big, to go out and trade for all that his or her creditors were 
worth. The issue was not so much limited liability for the passive investor - few 




It may be that a company constituted like that under consideration 
was not in the contemplation of the legislature at the time when the 
Act authorizing limited liability was passed; that if what is possible 
under the enactments as they stand had been foreseen a minimum 
sum would have been fixed as the least denomination of share 
permissible; and that it would have been made a condition that each 
of the seven persons should have a substantial interest in the 
company. But we have to interpret the law, not to make it; and it 
must be remembered that no one need trust a limited liability 
company unless he so please, and that before he does so, he can 
ascertain, if he so please, what is the capital of the company and 
how it is held. 
 
19
                                            
18  Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC at 46. 
19  The UK's Limited Partnership Act 1907 provided similar protection for the passive investor 
in a partnership, but by then the popularity of the registered company made this limited 
liability partnership all but unnecessary. 
 But limited liability for those who managed and directed 
the company, that is, those in a position to make mistakes, to conduct their 
businesses without proper care and attention, and worse, to abuse the faith 
invested in them and to be guilty of fraud, was something else. 
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Under the ancien regime, a trader was liable to the full extent of his fortune for 
debts incurred in the carrying on of his business. Creditors had to be paid in 
full, as far as this was possible with no artificial limits protecting part or all of the 
debtor's assets. The new regime not only removed that unlimited liability; it also 
created the machinery for the replacement of the human trader by the company 
trader. The latter remained fully liable without limit, just as its predecessor had 
been. Furthermore as a separate person, it, alone entered into the trading 
contracts and incurred the debts, it alone owned the property with which and on 
which the business was conducted, and where litigation was necessary, it, the 
company, was recognised as the appropriate litigant. Arguably, the limited 
liability conferred on the investors in the company was unnecessary and served 
only to make the investor feel more secure.20
The four judges could not and did not resist the plain language of the 
Companies Act of 1862, under which a company when created was a separate 
person from those who had created it. Indeed their resort to established 
principles to render Aron Salomon liable for the debts of A Salomon & Co – that 
a principal was responsible for the acts of his agent and a beneficiary had to 
indemnify his trustee for debts incurred in the execution of the trust – rested on 
the separate personalities of Salomon and the company. For them, the 
alternative was of such a revolutionary nature, that it could not have been 
intended by parliament. Limited liability had to remain restricted to investors in 
large corporations.
 Yet, for all the seamless 
sophistication by which the new order replaced the old, the potential for 
fundamental change was obvious and was clearly recognised by the four 
judges below in Salomon's case. 
 
21
                                            
20  See the very interesting discussion – and sources quoted - by Staughton j in JH Rayner 
Mincing Lane v Department of Trade and Industry [1987] BCC 430-431.  
21  This view has had more than its fair share of adherents, right up to the present. Even 
hardened proponents for limited liability like Easterbrook and Fischel Economic Structure 
of Corporate Law 50-54, accept that limited liability has less justification in small 
companies than it does in larger ones. See also Cohen 1998 Oklahoma Law Review 438ff; 
Vandervoort 2004 DePaul Bus & Comm LJ 53-56. 
 But the House of Lords famously thought otherwise. There 
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was no room for inferring such an intention and thus, they helped propel Britain 
into a new age.  
 
 
3 Directors duties and the zone of insolvency – the early period 
Salomon's case made more urgent the need for some vigilance on the part of 
creditors as to the solvency of their debtors who were registered companies. 
They had, after all, been told so by the House of Lords that "[e]very creditor is 
entitled to get and to hold the best security the law allows him to take".22 And, 
as we shall see shortly, those who could – essentially lenders as opposed to 
trade creditors23
The unsecured creditors of A Salomon and Company Limited, may 
be entitled to sympathy, but they have only themselves to blame for 
their misfortunes. They trusted the company, I suppose, because 
they had long dealt with Mr Salomon, and he had always paid his 
way; but they had full notice that they were no longer dealing with an 
individual and they must be taken to have been cognisant of the 
memorandum and of the articles of association
 – did. But as for those who could not, well, it was a brave new 
world and at least they knew the scoRe 
 
24
Having notice was all very well, but the only real protection for most traders was 
to abstain from dealing with a limited liability company, hardly an option for 
most. Investigating and monitoring the solvency of the company was equally 
illusory. But some lenders, on the other hand, could and did take full advantage 
of two significant instruments of credit and security – the floating charge and 
receivership. The latter was of ancient vintage as a means of managing leased 
real property, but emerged in the late nineteenth century as a vital adjunct to 




                                            
22  Lord Macnaghten in Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC at 52. 
23  This distinction was recognised in relation to partnership creditors in an early example of 
creditor prioritisation, by the enactment of the Partnership (Amendment) Act 1854 (known 
as Bovill's Act after its mover in the House of Lords, Lord Chief Justice Bovill) 
subsequently codified as s 2 and 3 in the Partnership Act 1890. 
24  Lord Macnaghten in Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC at 52-53; see also Lord Herschell, 
quoted above, and text associated with supra n 18. 
  
25  It is first mentioned in Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Company 
(1870) 5 Ch app 818; see Pennington 1960 Mod LR 630, and n 1 for other examples in the 
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Salomon, himself, had loaned money to the company and had secured his loan 
by means of a floating charge. The only one of the nine judgments in all courts 
to make this clear is that of Lord Justice Kay.26 Others speak only of the 
debenture issued to Salomon so it can be safely assumed that at that stage, 
anyway, a debenture was taken to include a floating charge.27
For such a catastrophe as has occurred in this case some would 
blame the law that allows the creation of a floating charge. But a 
floating charge is too convenient a form of security to be lightly 
abolished. I have long thought, and I believe some of your Lordships 
also think, that the ordinary trade creditors of a trading company 
ought to have a preferential claim on the assets in liquidation in 
respect of debts incurred within a certain limited time before the 
winding-up. But that is not the law at present. Everybody knows that 
when there is a winding-up debenture-holders generally step in and 
sweep off everything; and a great scandal it is.
 Indeed, it was 
this aspect of the Salomon case which, commercially speaking, was the most 
crucial. Not only was Salomon not obliged to indemnify the company's 
creditors, but the floating charge enabled him to be first in the queue of 
creditors. This must have added insult to the injury evinced by the four judges 
below and there is a somewhat lame recognition of this in the House of Lords: 
 
28
Receivership had been a means by which a landlord recovered possession of 
the leased property, and was now evolving, alongside the floating charge to 
meet the needs of commercial lenders, to enable the latter to manage the 




                                                                                                                               
1870s. 
26  Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch at 343 (the headnote also makes this clear). 
27  Without this, of course, 'debenture' would be little more than a fancy term for an unsecured 
loan. 
28  Lord Macnaghten, Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC at 53. 
29  See eg Peek v Trinsmaran Iron Company 2 Ch D 115; Makins v Percy Ibotson & Sons 
[1891] 1 Ch 133; Edwards v Standard Rolling Stock Syndicate [1893] 1 Ch 574; In Re 
Victoria Steamboats, Limited [1897] 1 Ch 158. 
 This 
provided the opportunity for a debenture-holder who feared for the solvency of 
the debtor, to seek to enforce the security right up to the point of appointing a 
manager of the business. The early cases are concerned with a debtor on the 
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brink of insolvent liquidation, when, to use the modern idiom, the debtor would 
quite clearly have entered within the zone of insolvency.  
 
Given that the appointment of a receiver was then in the discretion of the 
court,30 the issue remained open as to under what circumstances during the life 
of the debtor, the court would accede to an application such an appointment. 
On the one hand, the creditor would undoubtedly be looking for protection of 
the assets which secured the loan; on the other hand the debtor was not in 
liquidation. In Re New York Taxicab Company Limited,31 it was made clear that 
mere insolvency on the part of the debtor was not sufficient to sustain such an 
application. Although the debtor's assets were insufficient to secure the loan in 
full, and, if realised, would be insufficient to repay the principal and interest 
arrears owing to the debenture-holders, this did not justify the appointment of a 
receiver. The assets were not in jeopardy in the sense that there were no 
proceedings for their seizure; nor were any winding-up proceedings 
threatened.32
The balance between, on the one hand, an insolvent debtor wishing to continue 
to run its business and, on the other, secured creditors fearful that this would 
further deplete the security, proved even in these early post-Salomon days to 
be elusive. A few months after the New York Taxicab application, the matter 




                                            
30  This was later refined so as to make this a matter of contract between creditor and debtor.  
31  Re New York Taxicab Company Limited [1913] 1 Ch 1. 
32  As they had been in the appointment of the receiver in Victoria Steamboat decision [1897] 
1 Ch 158. 
33  Re Tilt Cove Copper Company Limited [1913] 2 Ch 588. 
 On this occasion, 
again there was no threat of seizure of the debtor's assets, nor of the initiation 
of liquidation proceedings. The debenture was not enforceable and the debtor 
had a reserve fund made up of accumulated profits of some £10,000. The 
company was proposing to distribute the fund among the shareholders as 
share dividends. Yet here the court distinguished the New York Taxicab case 
and granted the debenture-holder's application for the appointment of a 
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receiver. The crucial difference was that there, although the company was 
insolvent –  
 
there was nothing to show that, if the company continued to carry on 
its business as it was then doing, it might not before long again be 
prosperous and in a position to pay all its debenture-holders as well 
as its other creditors. It was not a case where the business of the 
company had come to an end…34
Credible evidence as to the cessation of the business (and the settled decision 
to assume no other business – which it might be said is implied in the Tilt Cove 
case) is critical. In a case where all that is wanting for an insolvent liquidation is 
the formal order – which we are led to believe was the case in Tilt Cove – it 
would seem eminently arguable that the debtor has entered the zone of 
insolvency and that the beneficiaries of the directors' duty have been switched 
from shareholders to creditors. Yet a question remains – which creditors? 
Secured creditors and unsecured creditors may well have different interests, 
especially if the unsecured creditors have a plan for the resuscitation of the 
debtor's business. The issue might then be the credibility of such a plan as 
against the superior status of the secured creditors. We will explore the 
essentially modern phenomenon of the shift of duty in the zone of insolvency, 
shortly, but before doing so we need to refer to a further complication in the 




In the Tilt Cove case, on the other hand, the company's business was clearly 
finished. It had long mined a copper mine – which, incidentally was situated on 
the coast of Newfoundland – and there was powerful evidence that all the 
copper had been exhausted. Once the reserve fund went there would be hardly 
assets left in the company and clearly though there were no arrears in interest 
payments, there would be insufficient to repay the principal loan. This justified a 




                                            
34  Re Tilt Cove Copper Company Limited [1913] 2 Ch at 594-595. 
35  Lawrence v West Somerset Mineral Railway Company [1918] 2 Ch 250. 
  




4 Lawrence's case 
The facts of Lawrence's case differ little from that of Tilt Cove. The defendant 
company's only asset – £5,500.00 annually from the lease of a railway which it 
owned – was about to expire. The lease was about to run out, the railway no 
longer carried traffic and the line had been scrapped. On receipt of the (final) 
annual rent, the company proposed to distribute this in accordance with the 
usual pattern – in interest payments to the debenture stockholders and 
dividends to the preference and ordinary shareholders. The proceedings were 
brought by the debenture-holders for an injunction to prohibit the distribution on 
the grounds that the following year there would be no or no sufficient assets to 
repay the principal loan. There were no arrears in interest payments, nor any 
other breaches of covenant, and, therefore nothing on which to base a case for 
the enforcement of the charge.  
 
The evidence of the end of the company's business seemed as cogent as the 
corresponding evidence in Tilt Cove (The railway was said to be "practically 
derelict and [could] never be reopened and worked at a profit"). The only 
difference was in the nature of the claim. Whereas in Tilt Cove the proceedings 
had been for the appointment of a receiver on the grounds that the debtor's 
assets were in jeopardy, here the proceedings were based on the claim that the 
money received should be treated as capital, rather than profits and therefore 
could not be used for a dividend distribution (which according to longstanding 
principles could only be paid out of profits and never out of capital). One of the 
submissions on behalf of the debenture-holders was formulated in 'zone of 
insolvency terms',  
 
…the directors of the company are quasi-trustees, and it is their duty 
as business men to set aside part of the funds coming to them for 
depreciation and loss of capital.36
                                            
36  At 253. 
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The court rejected the claim. The "only matter" according to the judge was "the 
true character of the fund in dispute" and the £5,500.00 was profit and 
according to the principle then prevailing, there was no obligation to make good 
any previous years' losses before declaring dividends. The clear thrust of this 
decision was underlined by the further ruling that the debenture-holders, in fact, 
had no locus standi to bring the claim.  
 
That there may be circumstances in which the Court would interfere 
at the suit of a debenture stock holder in the plaintiff's position to 
restrain the company from doing acts to his injury I do not doubt, but 
where the sole relief claimed is a declaration that a particular 
application of moneys in which the stockholder has no direct or 
immediate interest, and upon which he has no specific charge, will 
be ultra vires the company, I do not think I ought to hold the plaintiff 
competent to maintain the action.37
Lawrence's case emphasised the principle of entrepreneurial control. It followed 
the spirit of Salomon and resisted the route opened up by the receivership 
appointment cases where the debtor's assets were held to be in jeopardy. Yet, 
as far as UK entrepreneurialism was concerned, it was something of a pyrrhic 
victory for the entrepreneur. Loan creditors abandoned the court-based route of 
receivership appointments to seize control of the debtor's business and 
concentrated instead on expanding the contractual route offered by the floating 
charge. It was not long before provisions in the charge were upheld, allowing 
the creditor to appoint a receiver out of court, not only to protect the assets, but 
also to manage the business to the exclusion of the debtor's directors, and 




In many ways, the comprehensive control over the debtor which the receiver, 
appointed by the debenture-holder, came to exercise rendered unnecessary 
any thought in UK commercial practice, of the concept of the zone of insolvency 
and the shift of focus from shareholders to creditors. Once a debtor, which had 
  
 
                                            
37  At 257. 
38  Preferential creditors had to be paid before any reduction could be made in the secured 
creditor's debt, as was discovered to the embarrassment of at least two out of court 
appointed receivers, see Westminster Corporation v Haste [1950] Ch 442 and Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v Goldberg [1972] Ch 498. The current statutory provision is s 
40(2), UK Insolvency Act 1986. 
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granted a floating charge to a lender to secure an overdraft for the running of 
the business, went above the permitted overdraft limit, the lending bank could 
consider using its trump card of appointing an out of court receiver, regardless 
of whether a theoretical notion of an objectively assessed 'zone of insolvency' 
had been entered. In fact, the reign of the receiver in the UK came to an end on 
September 15, 2003, when the Enterprise Act of 2002 drastically curtailed the 
right of the debenture-holder to appoint a receiver.39
5 The liability of directors and officers to the insolvent estate 
 This was part of a package 
designed to strengthen the business rescue culture and it included measures to 
expand the scope of the court-based business rescue regime, Administration, 
which had, since its creation by the Insolvency Act 1986, lived its life in the 
shadow of receivership.  
 
 
5.1 The common law response to Salomon 
For the UK, Salomon's case created or confirmed a decided shift in the balance 
between entrepreneur and creditor. Limited liability trading was soon afterwards 
established in Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. Similar 
economic orders were also being set in place throughout the nineteenth century 
on the United States,40
The outlawing of fraud was always an imperative and this helped to create a 
doctrine which became and remains widespread, namely the lifting or piercing 
of the veil of incorporation, enabling the court to look to the individual 
 and many European countries and their empires. And 
with the new order, went the need to ensure that entrepreneurs did not abuse 
limited liability trading. At first, the courts assumed this guardianship with the 
limited tools that were available under the common law, where that was the 
prevailing legal system.  
 
                                            
39  S 250, Enterprise Act 2002 
40  See Alexander 1992 Harv L Rev 415. ("… unlimited shareholder liability was the general 
American rule until the early nineteenth century. [But b]y 1850, most states had enacted 
statutes providing for limited liability," though some states retained provisions for "double 
shareholder liability," and, "in California, pro rata shareholder liability survived until 1931.") 
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entrepreneur and to strip from him or her, the protective covering of the limited 
liability company. The judgments of the court of first instance and of the court of 
appeal in Salomon's case itself may be regarded as very early instances of this 
doctrine. An early post-Salomon example appeared in the UK in the decision in 
Re Darby,41
Legal systems frown on negligence, just like they do on fraud, but the line 
between legitimate risk-taking and negligent conduct may be very difficult to 
draw. Courts, with their usual and well-justified concern to avoid the use of 
hindsight, coupled with their often professed reluctance to get involved in the 
substance of business decision-making, have generally avoided this troubling 
area. Courts in the United States have tended to tread less warily than the 
courts in the United Kingdom, and one interesting line of authority in the U.S. 
which may constitute an exception to this abstinence, has been the 
development of the principle of piercing the veil of incorporation where the 
company has been under-capitilised.
 in which the court stripped the corporate protection from two 
fraudsters who had attempted shield from the public being invited to subscribe 
for shares in a company being promoted, the fact that that were both 
undischarged bankrupts.  
 
The doctrine of lifting the veil of incorporation has spawned a huge 
jurisprudence Aside from commercial abuse, other issues have demanded that 
courts and legislatures eliminate the use of the corporate form for the 
avoidance of legitimate obligations. In the matter of debt avoidance, while the 
courts were well able to cope with fraudulent conduct on the part of debtors, 
anything less than fraud posed a serious systemic problem. The grant of limited 
liability to entrepreneurs was designed to encourage the taking of risks, so to 
punish commercial conduct that did not amount to fraud by stripping away the 
protection of limited liability, might run counter to the commercial order which 
had been established.  
 
42
                                            
41  Re Darby [1911] 1 KB 95. 
42  See eg Ballantine Corporations 303; Berle 1947 Colum L Rev 349-353; Hamilton 1971 
Texas LR 985-989; Campbell 1975 Ky LJ 23; but see Thompson 1991 Cornell L Rev 1065. 
 




5.2 The legislative response to Salomon 
Some jurisdictions, specifically the UK, Australia and South Africa have enacted 
specific legislation which empowers a liquidator – and in South Africa others as 
well43 – to look to errant directors and officers to contribute to the insolvent 
estate where their errancy has contributed to the insolvent liquidation.44
in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or 
officer.
 Other 
jurisdictions, most notably the United States and Canada still rely largely on the 
common law, although, the so-called 'oppression remedy' a creature of the 
Canadian Business Corporations Act, is thought broad enough to encompass 
the complaints of creditors, where directors of a corporation have used their 
powers –  
 
45
This rather wide-ranging provision looks better suited to intra-corporate 
disputes, within solvent companies, but its terms of access to "any other person 





English law has long had provision to enable a liquidator to seek a contribution 
to the company's insolvent estate from directors whose actions prior to the 
insolvent liquidation have amounted to what is called fraudulent trading. This 
was first introduced in 1929,
 applies to ordinary creditors only at the court's 
discretion.  
 
47 and is now in the Insolvency Act 1986.48
                                            
43  See the discussion below of s 424, South African Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
44  See s 213-215, UK Insolvency Act 1986, s 588G, Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
45  S 241(2)(c). 
46  S 238(d). 
47  As s 275 of the Companies Act 1929. 
48  S 213. 
 It has to 
be said, however, that this provision has proved to be unsatisfactory, almost 
from its very inception. It was held to apply only with the soundest of proof of 
fraud and it left unanswered the issue of whether such provision should be 
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available where the directors' conduct was less than fraud but also not 
innocent. This, in itself, was a reason to seek an alternative basis on which to 
hold directors liable, where their management caused or contributed to the 
failure of their companies. 
 
In 1962, the Jenkins Committee drew attention to the –  
 
widespread criticism that the Companies Act as a whole does not at 
present deal adequately with the situation arising from fraud and 
incompetence on the part of directors – particularly directors of 
insolvent companies.49
directors and others, who have carried on the business of the 
company in a reckless manner [should be] personally responsible 
without limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts or liabilities of 
the company if the court so declares on the application of the official 




That committee went on to recommend a somewhat cautious extension of the 
law, namely that –  
 
50
This recommendation was not acted upon and the issue was further discussed 
by the Cork Committee,
 
 
51 which commented as follows in its report:52
A further mischief identified by the Cork Committee was the ease with which 
the directors and other officers of failed companies might continue their 
unsavoury and sometimes corrupt practices by trading through newly created 
companies and other business organisations. Indeed, in the most grotesque of 
 
 
The opportunity to implement these or any analogous proposals has 
never been taken, with the result that there is now universal 
dissatisfaction and frustration with this branch of the law. This is to 
be particularly deplored because it breeds both disrespect and 
contempt for the law in a context where there is need to enlist public 
support in an endeavour to promote the highest standards of 
business probity and competence. 
 
                                            
49  Report of the Company Law Committee at par 497. 
50  Ibid par 503(b). 
51  Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice ('Cork Report'). 
52  Ibid par 1738. 
HH RAJAK  PER/PELJ  2008(11)1 
/211 50 
such cases, the few remaining assets of the failed company could be sold off at 
'knockdown' prices to the newly created companies leaving creditors unpaid 
and corrupt directors not merely unpunished for their incompetence, but even 
benefiting thereby.53
'It is right', the Committee urged,
 
 
The then-existing machinery – proceedings to hold directors and other officers 
personally liable for the debts of the company – depended upon showing that 
they had carried on the business with the intent to defraud creditors. The courts 
interpreted this akin to criminal fraud, thereby making it particularly difficult to 
establish liability under this provision, bearing in mind the absence of any 
remedy for what is the much more common case, namely negligence or 
incompetence on the part of the directors. The equating of the criminal act of 
fraud with civil liability led to the virtual absence of any remedy for innocent 
unsecured creditors, despite acts of gross incompetence on the part of the 
directors. 
 
In the event, the Cork Committee recommended what was broadly a double-
fronted attack on these various mischiefs: 
 
54
                                            
53  Cork Report, par 741-743. 
54  Ibid par 1777. 
 'that it should be an offence to 
carry on a business dishonestly; and right, that, in the absence of 
dishonesty, no offence should be committed. Where, however, what 
is in question is not the punishment of an offender, but the provision 
of a civil remedy for those who have suffered financial loss, a 
requirement that dishonesty be proved is inappropriate. 
Compensation ought ... to be available to those who suffer 
foreseeable loss as a result, not only of fraudulent, but also of 
unreasonable behaviour'. 
 
The purpose of this recommendation was to substitute an objective test to 
determine the directors' personal liability for the subjective one which existed. 
The essence of the Committee's proposals was summed up by its 
recommendation that – 
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if the directors at any time consider the company to be insolvent, 
they should have a duty to take immediate steps for the company to 
be placed in receivership, administration or liquidation. Failure to do 
so would normally expose any director who is party to the company's 
continued trading to civil liability.55
                                            
55  Cork Report, par 1786. 
  
 
This recommendation was enacted by section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, 
which provides: 
  
(1)  Subject to subsection (3) below, if in the course of the 
winding-up of a company it appears that subsection (2) of this 
section applies in relation to a person who is or has been a 
director of the company, the court, on the application of the 
liquidator, may declare that that person is to be liable to make 
such contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the court 
thinks proper. 
 
(2)  This subsection applies in relation to a person if – 
 
(a)  the company has gone into insolvent liquidation, 
(b)  at some time before the commencement of the winding-
up of the company, that person knew or ought to have 
concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that 
the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation, 
and 




(3)  The court shall not make a declaration under this section with 
respect to any person if it is satisfied that after the condition 
specified in subsection (2)(b) was first satisfied in relation to 
him that person took every step with a view to minimizing the 
potential loss to the company's creditors as (assuming him to 
have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the 
company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation) he 
ought to have taken. 
 
(4)  For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3) the facts which a 
director of a company ought to know or ascertain, the 
conclusions which he ought to reach and the steps which he 
ought to take are those which would be known or ascertained 
or reached or taken, by a reasonably diligent person having 
both – 
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(a)  the general knowledge, skill and experience that may 
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the 
same functions that are carried out by that director in 
relation to the company, and 
(b)  the general knowledge, skill and experience that that 
director has. 
 
(5)  The reference in subsection (4) to the functions carried out in 
relation to a company by a director of the company includes 
any functions which he does not carry out but which have 
been entrusted to him 
 
(6)  For the purposes of this section, a company goes into 
insolvent liquidation if it goes into liquidation at a time when its 
assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts, and other 
liabilities and the expenses of winding-up. 
 
(7)  In this section 'director' includes a shadow director. 
 
The Australian equivalent to the concept of the British wrongful trading 
provision is 'insolvent trading',56 and which, like section 214 of the UK 
Insolvency Act, moves away from the earlier and now quite outmoded concept 
of fraudulent trading. The Australian provision has a more directed focus than 
the British provision in that there is a positive duty placed on the director to 
ensure that no further debts are incurred when the company is insolvent or 
would become insolvent as a result of the debt. There must be reasonable 
ground for suspecting that the company was insolvent or would become 
insolvent at the time of the incurring of the debt. The suspicion must involve "a 
positive feeling of actual fear or misgiving amounting to an opinion which is not 
supported by sufficient evidence",57
                                            
56  S 588G, Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
57  Queensland Bacon v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266. 
 that is to say a lower threshold than 
expecting or knowing that the company is insolvent. The standard for 
suspecting the insolvency is that of the awareness of insolvency by a 
reasonable person in a like position in a company in the company's 
circumstances. Like the British provision, the Australian provision applies only 
to directors, but the definition is wide enough to include shadow or de facto 
directors. 
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The South African provision has a similar object to the British and Australian 
provisions, but has some novel features. It provides as follows: 
 
If it at any time appears that any business of a corporation was or is 
being carried on recklessly, with gross negligence or with intent to 
defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose, a court may on 
the application of the Master, or any creditor, member or liquidator of 
the corporation, declare that any person who was knowingly a party 
to the carrying on of the business in any such manner, shall be 
personally liable for all or any of such debts or other liabilities of the 
corporation as the court may direct, and the court may give such 
further orders as it considers proper for the purpose of giving effect 
to the declaration and enforcing that liability.  
 
It is not limited in its application to directors, nor to the circumstances of the 
company being insolvent, although the latter is probably of little significance 
because if the company is solvent, the creditor's debt will be paid in the normal 
way. But the fact that it is not so limited is underlined by the fact that its use is 
not limited to a liquidator, but is also available, inter alios, to creditors and 
members of the company. The possibility has been explored of the use of this 
provision – in fact of the equivalent section to the same effect in the South 
African Close Corporations Act,58 – as a fast track debt-enforcement process, 
where the company is not insolvent. This was successful in one instance,59 but 
this was clearly contradicted by a later case of the South African Court of 
Appeal.60 The later court held that the provision should not be available where 
the company was able to meet the debt. Thus even if the person who acted on 
behalf of the company had been reckless or even fraudulent, this should be of 
no concern to the creditor, whose only interest is the recovery of the debt. This 
would, with respect, seem to be the preferable approach to a provision whose 
purpose, arguably, is the protection of creditors rather than the punishment of 
errant management.61
 
 Apart from this it would seem unnecessary to import into 
the debtor/creditor relationship alien concepts such as to the state of the 
debtor's mind, unless the circumstances were commercially compelling. 
                                            
58  S 64 (1), Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
59  Harri v On-Line Management 2001 (4) SA 1097. 
60  L & P Plant Hire v Bosch 2002 (2) SA 662. 
61  See Sigwadi 2003 SA Mercantile LJ 303. 
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Such compelling commercial circumstances might be said to arise where the 
principle of protecting creditors intersects with the principle of encouraging the 
rescue of potentially viable insolvent businesses. This has been considered by 
the South African courts in relation to the intersection between section 424 of 
the Companies Act and the provision which enables a scheme or arrangement 
to be made between an insolvent company and its creditors, so as to seek the 
rescue of that company. The provision in the South African Companies Act,62 
closely resembles that of other jurisdictions,63 and encourages the rescues of 
businesses where this seems attainable as opposed to what might otherwise 
be a wasteful liquidation. The precise question that arose was the status of a 
pre-existing debt after a scheme or arrangement had been agreed. Did this 
debt remain in existence after the scheme was agreed, more particularly did the 
erstwhile creditor remain a creditor within the meaning of this term under 
section 424, so as to be qualified to present an application based on the 
alleged reckless trading of a director of the company debtor? This question was 
answered in the affirmative.64
It is interesting to reflect on the distinction between this holding and that which 
rejected the use of section 424 when the company debtor was not insolvent. In 
both instances, the company was not in liquidation and was continuing to trade. 
Yet, in the latter instance, the company was no longer under any obligation to 
pay the debt in view of the agreed scheme of arrangement under section 311 of 
the South African Companies Act. The interpretation of the court, that the 
erstwhile creditor remained a creditor for the purposes of section 424, is in line 




The experience of these countries where there is specific legislation aimed at 
providing creditors with a claim against errant directors and other officers where 
the debt is irrecoverable from the company, is mixed. The imperative remains 
 
  
                                            
62  S 311. 
63  See eg, s 428, UK Companies Act 1985, and s 895ff, Companies Act 2006. 
64  See Pressma Services v Schuttler 1990 (2) SA 411; Lordon v Dusky Dawn Investments 
1998 (4) SA 519. 
65  See Sigwadi supra n 61 at 387. 
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not to disturb the delicate balance between encouraging entrepreneurial 
initiative and protecting creditors against far-fetched, outlandish and fraudulent 
conduct on the part of the entrepreneur. The more carefully manicured the 
terms of the legislation to take account of this imperative, the more it is subject 
to interpretation. Given the court's concern to avoid hindsight and to second 
guess business decisions, there is little room for manoeuvre. Added to this, 
there are issues such as the cost of the proceedings – especially in the 
circumstances of an insolvent estate – and the possibility that even in 
successful applications, the errant directors and officers may not have the 
money to meet the judgment.  
 
 
6 Shifting directors duties from shareholders to creditors in the zone 
of insolvency 
The idea that prior to any formal filing for insolvency, the directors of a company 
may be obliged to consider the interests of the company's creditors to the 
exclusion of the company or its shareholders, can be traced back at least 20 
years to the Australian case of Kinsela & Anor v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in 
liq).66 It was neatly summarised in the following terms by Street cj:67
                                            
66  Kinsela & Anor v Russell Kinsela [1986] 4 NSWLR 722, at 730; (1986) 4 ACLC 215. 
67  At 730; 221. 
 
 
In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders 
entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the company when 
questions of the duty of directors arise. If, as a general body, they 
authorise or ratify a particular action of the directors, there can be no 
challenge to the validity of what the directors have done. But where a 
company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They 
become prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, 
to displace the power of the shareholders and directors to deal with 
the company's assets. It is in a practical sense their assets and not 
the shareholders' assets that, through the medium of the company, 
are under the management of the directors pending either 
liquidation, return to solvency, or the imposition of some alternative 
administration. 
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This sentiment was approved shortly afterwards in the UK by Dillon lj in West 
Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liquidation) v Dodd,68 and also appeared in American 
jurisprudence around the same time.69 A similar duty-shifting principle can be 
detected in New Zealand, although the leading case in this regard – Nicholson 
v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd70 – reveals a degree of scepticism as to the 
appropriateness of this extension of the directors' duties. This scepticism, it 
should be added, is shared by highly authoritative commentators in South 
Africa,71 Australia,72 and the United States.73




Although courts have uniformly held that directors of a corporation 
do not owe a fiduciary duty to bondholders, there is an important, but 
 
declared Canada possessed of this duty-shifting principle. This decision is more 
radical than the expressions of a similar principle in other jurisdictions, in the 
sense that it gives a clearly defined form to the duty which directors owe to 
creditors. It may have been limited to the duty of care in this case, but it was 
precisely that same duty of care as laid down in the Canadian Business 
Corporations Act. It might be true to say that all jurisdictions are vague in 
relation as to when the duty shifts, when, as it were, the debtor company 
crosses the line and enters the zone of insolvency. But, this aside, other 
formulations are much more tentative than that of the Canadian Supreme 
Court. Thus, in relation to the corresponding duty in the United States, 
 
                                            
68  West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250, which itself has been approved on a 
number of occasions, see eg Timothy Brown (as Liquidator of Cityspan Limited) v Nicholas 
Clark 2007 EWHC 751 (Ch); Facia Footwear v Hinchliffe [1998] 1 BCLC 218 at 228b-c; Re 
MDA Investment Management [2005] BCC 783, 805; Colin Gwyer & Associates & Anor v 
London Wharf (Limehouse) [2003] BCC 885, 906. 
69  See Lin 1993 Vanderbilt Law Review 1512 (see authorities quoted in n 88 and 89); Coffee 
and Klein 1991 Univ of Chicago LR 1255-1256 (authorities in n 1401-142).  
70  Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) [1985] 1 NZLR 242; on this and related decisions see the 
excellent comment on the first instance decision in Peoples Department Stores Inc v Wise, 
by Thomson 2000 UT Fac L Rev par 121-128. 
71  See Havenga 1997 SA Mercantile LJ 318ff. 
72  Worthington 1991-92 Melbourne University LR 121, 122, 133ff, 151ff. 
73  Hu and Westbrook 2007 Columbia Law Review 1321-1403. 
74  People's Department Stores Inc v Wise 244 DLR (4th) 564, affirming the decision of the 
Quebec Court of Appeal, 224 DLR (4th) 509, which in turn reversed in part the decision of 
Greenberg j [1998] QJ No 3571 (Quebec Superior Court). 
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ill-defined, exception to this general rule, which arises when the 
corporation becomes insolvent.75
There is, however, an important yet ill-defined exception to the legal 
primacy of shareholder interests. Several courts have held that once 
the corporation becomes insolvent, directors owe a fiduciary duty to 
creditors. This shift of fiduciary obligation takes place even if 
insolvency occurs long before liquidation or commencement of 
bankruptcy proceedings. Arguably, this duty to creditors can be 
construed broadly to require directors to take actions that would 
maximize the creditors' interests once the firm becomes insolvent. 
On the other hand, this duty can be construed more narrowly to 
require only that the directors treat all creditors equally and to 
prohibit directors form withdrawing corporate assets for the benefit of 




Yet, diffident or not, made flesh as by the Canadian Supreme Court or left 
nebulous as in other jurisdictions, it is clear that the general consensus is that 
we are here talking about a duty owed to the creditors.
 
 
77 Those who recall the 
firmness with which directors' duties were once stated to be owed to the 
company alone, or to the company and the shareholders alone, may swallow 
hard, but nevertheless accept this brave new world. Yet if we contrast this with 
what is accepted as being one of the first, if not the first, statement of this duty-
shifting principle, we might wonder at the rapidity and extent of its development. 
Cheng Wai Yuen reminds us of what he aptly describes as Mr Justice Mason's 
"almost casual statement" which he regards as the "first explicit judicial 
recognition of any form of duty to corporate creditors".78
In [respect of the duty of directors to consider the best interests of 
creditors of the company] it should be emphasised that the directors 
of a company in discharging their duty to the company must take into 
account the interests of its shareholders and creditors. Any failure by 
the directors to take into account the interests of creditors will have 




                                            
75  Coffee and Klein supra n 69 at 1255 (footnotes omitted). 
76  Lin supra n 69 at 1512 (footnotes omitted). 
77  Other academic voices accepting the new orthodoxy include Ziegel 1993 UTLJ 511 and 
Cheng Wai Yuen 2002 Sing LR 104. 
78  Supra n 77 at 105. 
79  Mason j in Walker v Wimborne [1975] 137 CLR 1. 
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The duty described reads very much like part of the directors' duty to the 
company, and enforceable by the shareholders of the company (or where 
breached, ratifiable by the shareholders). What could be more sensible on the 
part of the directors in the execution of their responsibilities to the company, 
than to ensure that creditors, especially creditors on whom the company may 
well depend, are well treated. A failure to do so may be explained away by a 
short term liquidity and would be likely to attract understanding and ratification 
on the part of the shareholders. But a failure to do so that could not be readily 
explained and which caused loss to the company would certainly be open to 
redress by the shareholders. It may well be that Mr Justice Mason had no 
revolutionary intentions.  
 
Now, however, that the genie is out of the bottle, should we regard this duty-
shifting principle a desirable addition to the legal tools for the governance of 
insolvent companies? Its economic justification is to reset the balance between 
creditors and entrepreneurs, which, arguably is both presumptuous and 
cavalier. If something so fundamental is in need of adjustment, it can hardly be 
appropriate for this to come about in the form of a principle which is deeply 
uncertain both as to scope and incidence. 'Ill-defined'80 seems to be the closest 
we can get to describing it and the notion of a 'zone of insolvency' is quaint at 
best. An appropriate simile may be that of a blind man in a dark room looking 
for a black cat that isn't there. It is argued that in the United States the duty-
shifting principle has a long tradition, deriving, from the old trust fund doctrine,81 
whose origin is ascribed to a judgment of Justice Joseph Story in 1824,82
Yet, should not some thought be given to its widespread appearance? This is 
intriguing and may be a general response to some trend arising from recent 
global or near-global financial phenomena. But apart from a similar description 
in the several jurisdictions, it does not seem possible to construct out of these 
 but 
the link must be tenuous at best.  
 
                                            
80  See the text associated with n 46 and 47. 
81  In re Mortgage America Corporation 714 F 2d 1266, 1268-1269. 
82  Wood v Dummer 30 F Cas 435 (D Me 1824) (No 17,994). 
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various manifestations, a single legal principle. In particular – and apart from 
Canadian Peoples Department Stores Inc v Wise83
It is, to my mind, a telling fact that all the sources which declare the existence of 
the shift in the duty are concerned with events in the formal insolvency. Could 
 – it is not possible to say 
whether the duty whose focus shifts from shareholders to creditors, is precisely 
the same duty or set of duties as that or those owed by the directors to the 
company and shareholders during the period when the company is a solvent, 
going concern. The director's fiduciary duty would seem a very uneasy 
transplant, given its emphasis on accountability for profits from unauthorised 
use of the company's property and its concern for the misappropriation of the 
company's property. If damages are awarded against a director for the 
misappropriation of the company's property, or the director is ordered to 
account for taking unauthorised profits or using a corporate opportunity for his 
or her own benefit, would the proceeds of such an award be impressed with a 
trust in favour of the creditors? 
 
The director's duty of care seems a little more ripe for transplant, but if, indeed, 
the directors acted without due care and attention causing a diminution in the 
value of the company's property, would a single creditor really have a right of 
action against the directors during the period before any formal filing for 
insolvency? And, if so, would the claim be for the loss in value of the company's 
property or for the debt owed by the company to the creditor? 
 
This may seem a somewhat satirical approach to this issue, but it does seem to 
me to highlight an important and as yet unexplored feature of this duty-shifting 
principle. One answer to the satirical questions may be that such circumstances 
are never contemplated and that these are duties whose breach only has 
consequences when the company is already in a formal insolvency and whose 
effect is only designed to swell the insolvent estate for the benefit of the whole 
class of creditors. But if this is so, in what sense is it appropriate to speak of the 
duty shifting before the formal insolvency is declared?  
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we say with confidence that a creditor would have standing where, before any 
formal insolvency, he or she sought to prevent the directors from acting on a 






No one would dispute the principle that in a formal corporate insolvency, the 
estate should be charged with the payment, as far as possible, of the 
company's debts. One might also feel comfortable, if not entirely happy, with 
the principle that the estate should benefit from contributions by the directors 
and officers whose conduct contributed to the insolvent liquidation of the 
company. Equally, most people would accept the necessity that entrepreneurs 
should benefit from a principle which protects their own private estate should 
the company, through with the entrepreneurial activity being conducted, go into 
insolvent liquidation. Society, in general, it is thought, wants to encourage 
entrepreneurial activity and the limitation of the entrepreneur's liability is 
accepted as the necessary incentive for this. There is, clearly a delicate 
balance to be struck between creditors and entrepreneurs. If this is now thought 
to be in need of adjustment, in its current uncertain state, the shifting of the 
focus of the directors' duties does not seem appropriate for this purpose.  
 
                                            
84  See the discussion of Lawrence v West Somerset Mineral Railway Company (at 4, supra n 
35). 
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